HEA|  |04218cam a2200397 a 4500
001|  |022011000884
003|  |CAL
005|  |20110330094925.4
008|  |100511s2010    nyuab    b    001 0 eng  
010|  |▼a  2010020088
020|  |▼a9780521148085 (pbk.)
020|  |▼a0521148081 (pbk.)
020|  |▼a9780521765770 (hbk.)
020|  |▼a0521765773 (hbk.)
035|  |▼a(OCoLC)ocn607985724
040|  |▼aDLC▼cDLC▼dYDX▼dBTCTA▼dYDXCP▼-
   |  |dCDX▼dYHM▼dDLC
042|  |▼apcc
043|  |▼ae-ur－－-
050|00|▼aHD9575.S65▼bJ66 2010
082|00|▼a333▼222
093|  |▼aF451.262▼25
099|  |▼aCAL 022011049514
100|1 |▼aJones Luong, Pauline.
245|10|▼aOil is not a curse :▼bowners-
   |  |hip structure and institutions-
   |  | in Soviet successor states /▼-
   |  |cPauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal.
260|  |▼aNew York :▼bCambridge Univer-
   |  |sity Press,▼c2010.
300|  |▼axiii, 425 p. :▼bill., maps ;▼c24 cm.
490|1 |▼aCambridge studies in compara-
   |  |tive politics
504|  |▼aIncludes bibliographical ref-
   |  |erences (p. 361-397) and index.
505|0 |▼aRethinking the resource curs-
   |  |e : ownership structure and in-
   |  |stitutions in mineral rich sta-
   |  |tes －－ Why fiscal regimes : ta-
   |  |xation and expenditure in mine-
   |  |ral rich states －－ State owner-
   |  |ship with control versus priva-
   |  |te domestic ownership －－ Two v-
   |  |ersion of rentierism : state o-
   |  |wnership with control in Turkm-
   |  |enistan and Uzbekistan －－ Petr-
   |  |oleum rents without rentierism-
   |  | : domestic private ownership -
   |  |in the Russian Federation －－ S-
   |  |tate ownership without control-
   |  | versus private foreign owners-
   |  |hip －－ Eluding the obsolescing-
   |  | bargain : state ownership wit-
   |  |hout control in Azerbaijan －－ -
   |  |Revisiting the obsolescing bar-
   |  |gain : foreign private ownersh-
   |  |ip in Kazakhstan －－ Taking dom-
   |  |estic politics seriously : exp-
   |  |laining the structure of owner-
   |  |ship over mineral resources －－-
   |  | The myth of the resource curse.
520|  |▼a"This book makes two central-
   |  | claims: first, that mineral-r-
   |  |ich states are cursed not by t-
   |  |heir wealth but, rather, by th-
   |  |e ownership structure they cho-
   |  |ose to manage their mineral we-
   |  |alth and second, that weak ins-
   |  |titutions are not inevitable i-
   |  |n mineral-rich states. Each re-
   |  |presents a significant departu-
   |  |re from the conventional resou-
   |  |rce curse literature, which ha-
   |  |s treated ownership structure -
   |  |as a constant across time and -
   |  |space and has presumed that mi-
   |  |neral-rich countries are incap-
   |  |able of either building or sus-
   |  |taining strong institutions - -
   |  |particularly fiscal regimes. T-
   |  |he experience of the five petr-
   |  |oleum-rich Soviet successor st-
   |  |ates (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, -
   |  |the Russian Federation, Turkme-
   |  |nistan, and Uzbekistan) provid-
   |  |es a clear challenge to both o-
   |  |f these assumptions. Their res-
   |  |pective developmental trajecto-
   |  |ries since independence demons-
   |  |trate not only that ownership -
   |  |structure can vary even across-
   |  | countries that share the same-
   |  | institutional legacy but also-
   |  | that this variation helps to -
   |  |explain the divergence in thei-
   |  |r subsequent fiscal regimes"－－-
   |  |Provided by publisher.
520|  |▼a"This book makes two central-
   |  | claims: First, that mineral-r-
   |  |ich states are cursed not by t-
   |  |heir wealth per se but rather -
   |  |by the ownership structure the-
   |  |y chose to manage their minera-
   |  |l wealth; and second, that wea-
   |  |k institutions are not inevita-
   |  |ble in mineral-rich states. Ea-
   |  |ch claim represents a signific-
   |  |ant departure from the convent-
   |  |ional \'resource curse\' literat-
   |  |ure, which has treated ownersh-
   |  |ip structure as a constant acr-
   |  |oss time and space and presume-
   |  |d that mineral-rich countries -
   |  |are incapable of either buildi-
   |  |ng or sustaining strong instit-
   |  |utions - particularly fiscal r-
   |  |egimes. The experience of the -
   |  |five petroleum-rich Soviet suc-
   |  |cessor states (Azerbaijan, Kaz-
   |  |akhstan, the Russian Federatio-
   |  |n, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekista-
   |  |n) provides a clear challenge -
   |  |to both of these assumptions. -
   |  |Their respective developmental-
   |  | trajectories since independen-
   |  |ce demonstrate not only that o-
   |  |wnership structure can vary ev-
   |  |en across countries that share-
   |  | the same institutional legacy-
   |  |, but also that this variation-
   |  | helps explain the divergence -
   |  |in their subsequent fiscal reg-
   |  |imes"－－Provided by publisher.
650| 0|▼aPetroleum industry and trade-
   |  |▼zSoviet Union.
650| 0|▼aCommonwealth of Independent States.
700|1 |▼aWeinthal, Erika.
830| 0|▼aCambridge studies in compara-
   |  |tive politics.
998|  |▼aCALIS

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